US Capitol Dome Houses of Congress Washington DCDear Friends,

There have been some major developments in the trade, solar cells, collection actions against Chinese banks, 337/patents, antitrust and securities areas.




On August 20, 2013, in the attached article the Seattle Times reported about the impact of the Chinese Polysilicon Antidumping and Countervailing Duty case against the United States on REC Silicon, a Washington State manufacturer of polysilicon.  POLYSILICON IMPACT REC SILICON  The article states:

“REC Silicon, a large manufacturer of solar-grade polysilicon in Central Washington, warns of a “massive blow” to its business if China and the United States don’t resolve a trade dispute.”

The article goes on to state:

“REC Silicon, with 500 workers in this Central Washington town, annually produces enough solar-grade polysilicon to power more than 2 million homes. But a global trade battle over solar panels threatens to plunge REC and its local workforce into financial crisis.

China last month slapped hefty duties on U.S.-made polysilicon in a move widely seen as retaliation for American tariffs imposed last year on imports of Chinese solar panels. Now, China’s solar-panel producers face a 57 percent tariff on polysilicon bought from REC, raising the likelihood that they’ll get the raw material elsewhere.

Chinese customers account for nearly 80 percent of the polysilicon produced in Moses Lake, so the stakes are huge, said REC general counsel Francine Sullivan.  “This is potentially a massive blow to our business. We’re doing all we can to keep going, but we can’t manage too much longer without government help,” she said. . . .

Polysilicon, a hyper-pure form of silicon, is the main material in solar panels. REC places fifth on an IHS ranking of the world’s largest polysilicon producers. Last fall, the United States imposed tariffs of 30 to 35 percent on solar panels from China after finding that unfair government subsidies had enabled Chinese producers to sell below cost.

A group of seven U.S. solar panel makers, including the American division of Germany-based SolarWorld, which operates a plant in Oregon, set off the investigation after filing a trade complaint against China.

REC warned that steep tariffs on Chinese imports would drive up solar energy costs, dampen consumer demand and destroy jobs. Chief Executive Officer Tore Torvund also said China might use the tariffs as an excuse to introduce duties on U.S.-made polysilicon.  In an April 2012 op-ed piece for The Seattle Times, Torvund noted that uncertainty surrounding the trade dispute already had caused REC to put off a planned $1 billion investment in new capacity at the Moses Lake plant.

“Other companies in every segment of the industry may also hedge their bets,” he wrote. Indeed, Dow Corning-owned Hemlock Semiconductor, the third-largest polysilicon producer, announced plans in January to lay off 400 employees at its Michigan and Tennessee plants, citing an oversupply of solar panels and the potential for Chinese tariffs. . . .

As expected, China’s Ministry of Commerce moved July 18 to enact preliminary tariffs on U.S. polysilicon, setting REC’s rate at 57 percent and Hemlock’s at 53 percent. The duties are an initial step before a final ruling due next February. . . .

To supporters of a U.S.-China trade accord, REC serves two bigger purposes: Not only is it part of America’s green-energy push, but it also provides the sort of jobs sorely lacking in today’s still-struggling economy.

“It would be a big blow to the community if they were to lose them,” said Brian Bonlender, director of the Washington state Department of Commerce. “We’re taking this very seriously, because there’s no doubt a lot of jobs in jeopardy right now.”

What goes around in the US China Trade War comes around.


An illustration of how the Commerce Department can use surrogate values to distort antidumping rates is the Glycine from China case.  In the 2012 antidumping review investigation, after years of using India as a surrogate country, Commerce switched surrogate countries to Indonesia.  Since Indonesia does not have good surrogate values for raw material/chemical inputs, such as chlorine, Commerce calculated a dumping margin that went from 52 to 452% for Baoding Mantong.  No dumping rate is too high for Commerce.  As you know, US importers are retroactively liable for the difference plus interest.


On August 28, 2013 the Commerce Department initiated antidumping and countervailing duty review investigations on Certain Steel Gratings from China.  Chinese companies in the review are listed below:

Anping Jinyuan Metal, Anping Jinyuan Metal Co., Ltd., Comtrust Metal & Ware Mesh Products Co. Ltd., Dalian AW Gratings,     Dalian AW Gratings, Ltd., Fujian Youxi Best Arts & Crafts Co., Ltd., Guangzhou Webforge Grating Co., Ltd., Hebei Jinshi Industrial Metal Co., Ltd., Jiashan Qilmei Grating Co., Ltd., Kingjoy Building Decorative Materials Co., Ltd., Ningbo Haitian International Co., Ltd., Ningbo Jiulong Machinery Manufacturing Co., Ltd., Ningbo Lihong Steel Grating Co., Ltd., Ningbo Zhenhai Jiulong Electronic Equipment Factory, Shanghai Shenhao Steel Structure Designing Co., Ltd., Shanghai DAHE Grating Co., Ltd., Sinosteel Yantai Steel Grating Co., Ltd., Tianchang Flying-Dragon Metallic Products Co., Ltd., Qing Auging Mechanical Xinxing Grating Factory, Yantai Hercules Metal Ltd., Yantai Xinke Steel Structure Co., Ltd., Zhejian Hengzhou Steel Grating Co., Ltd.

Also another antidumping (“AD”) review was initiated on Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from China.  Chinese companies are listed below:

Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., Beijing Jia Mei AO Trading Co., Ltd., Beijing Jinghua Global Trading Co., Ltd., Benxi Northern Steel Pipes, Co. Ltd., CNOOC Kingland Pipeline Co., Ltd., ETCO (China) International Trading Co., Ltd., Guangzhou Juyi Steel Pipe Co., Ltd., Huludao City Steel Pipe Industrial, Jiangsu Changbao Steel Tube Co., Ltd., Jiangsu Yulong Steel Pipe Co., Ltd., Liaoning Northern Steel Pipe Co., Ltd., Pangang Chengdu Group Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., Shanghai Zhongyou TIPO Steel Pipe Co., Ltd., Tianjin Haoyou Industry Trade Co., Ltd., Tianjin Baolai International Trade Co., Ltd., Tianjin Longshenghua Import & Export, Tianjin Shuangjie Steel Pipe Co., Ltd., Weifang East Steel Pipe Co., Ltd., WISCO & CRM Wuhan Materials & Trade, Zhejiang Kingland Pipeline Industry Co., Ltd.

If Chinese companies in these cases exported these products during the July 1, 2012-June 30, 2013 review period, they must enter a notice of appearance and apply for a separate antidumping rate.  Failure to do so will result in the Chinese company receiving the highest antidumping rate, and the US importer of such products during the review period being exposed to substantial retroactive liability.


As mentioned in prior newsletters, we are working with APCO, a well-known lobbying/government relations firm in Washington DC, on establishing a US importers/end users lobbying coalition to lobby against the expansion of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws against China.

The objective of the Coalition will be to educate the US Congress and Administration on the damaging effects of the US China trade war, especially US antidumping and countervailing duty laws, on US importers and US downstream industries.

We will be targeting two major issues—Working for market economy treatment for China in 2016 and working against retroactive liability for US importers. The key point of our arguments is that these changes in the US antidumping and countervailing duty laws are to help US companies, especially US importers and downstream industries.

If anyone is interested in the Coalition, please feel free to contact me.



The limitation on the US pressure on the Chinese government’s implementation of its antidumping and countervailing duty laws is indicated by the attached August 12th announcement by the Chinese government that it has fully complied with the WTO rulings against the Chinese government’s determinations in the antidumping and countervailing duty case aimed at imports of US grain-oriented flat rolled electrical steel (GOES). MOFCOM GOES ANNOUNCEMENT The US industry disagrees.

In response to the WTO decision, China lowered the countervailing duty (“CVD”) rate facing AK Steel from 11.7 percent to 3.4 percent. MOFCOM also lowered the CVD rate facing ATI Allegheny Ludlum, the other main company affected by the case, down from its previous rate of 12 percent to 3.4%.

Concerning antidumping (“AD”) rates, China did not alter the AD duties of 7.9 percent and 19.9 percent on steel exports from AK Steel and Allegheny Ludlum, respectively, although it did lower the “all others” AD rate from 64.8 percent to 13.8 percent.

China maintains that the Appellate Body ruling did not require it to alter the AD rates facing the two primary steel companies.

This dispute between the US and China on US exports of GOES has been going on for years. Meanwhile, however, the United States has imposed numerous antidumping and countervailing duties on imports of Chinese steel.

In addition, because US importers are exposed to retroactive liability on Chinese imports under the US antidumping and countervailing duty laws, no US importer dares to keep importing Chinese steel once cases are filed. So the real effect of steel antidumping and countervailing duty cases against China is to shut out Chinese steel imports into the United States.

No other country exposes its importers to retroactive liability under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Only the United States.

When viewed in this context, it is easier to understand why the Chinese government is playing the trade game in the GOES case.


In prior posts, I have mentioned that US Plaintiffs could bring an action against Chinese banks in New York Federal District to recover money owed on US judgments by Chinese companies.  Attached is a complaint that was just filed on September 4, 2013 for garnishment in the US Federal District Court in New York against the Chinese Industrial and Commercial Bank for judgment debts owed by Chinese tire companies.  TIRES COLLECTION CASE

Plaintiffs sued Chinese companies, Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., Ltd., Linglong Group Co., Ltd., Shandong Linglong Tire Co., Ltd., AI Dobowi Ltd., Al Dobowi Tyre Co., LLC, Tyrex International, Ltd., and Tyrex International Rubber Co., Ltd., (collectively, “Judgment Debtors”) and in July 2010 a jury empaneled by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held the Judgment Debtors jointly and severally liable for, among other claims, copyright infringement and conversion and awarded the Plaintiffs $26 million. The Eastern District of Virginia entered the judgment for $26,000,000 against the Judgment Debtors in the case, captioned In re: Outsidewall Tire Litigation, 1 :09-cv-1217 (E.D. Va. ), on October 28, 2010 (the “Judgment”).

Now the US Plaintiffs have sued the Chinese Bank Branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank in New York saying give me the assets of the companies in China that you the Bank have to satisfy this $26 million judgment.

Note that this case is to recover money held by the Chinese bank in China to apply to the $26 million US judgment against the Chinese tire companies.  Lesson, the Chinese companies can run, but they can no longer hide from US judgments.




On August 14, 2013 Toyo Tire filed a new section 337 design patent case against imports of tires from China.  The notice is set forth below:

Docket No: 2973

Document Type: 337 Complaint

Filed By: V. James Adduci, II

Firm/Org: Adduci, Mastriani and Schaumberg

Behalf Of: Toyo Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd., Toyo Tire Holdings of Americas Inc., Toyo tire U.S.A. Corp., Nitto Tire U.S.A. Inc., and Toyo Tire North America Manufacturing Inc.

Date Received: August 14, 2013

Commodity: Tires

Description: Letter to Lisa R. Barton, Acting Secretary, USITC; requesting that the Commission conduct an investigation under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended regarding Certain Tires and Products Containing Same. The respondents are: Hong Kong Tri-Ace Tire Co., Ltd., China; Weifang Shunfuchang Rubber & Plastic Co., Ltd., China; Doublestar Dong Feng Tyre Co., Ltd., China; Shandong Yongtai Chemical Group Co., Ltd., China; MHT Luxury Alloys, Rancho Dominguez, CA; Wheel Warehouse, Inc., Anaheim, CA; Shandong Linglong Tyre co., Ltd., China; Dunlap & Kyle Company, Inc., d/b/a Gateway Tire and Service, Batesville, MS; Unicorn Tire Corp., Memphis, TN; West KY Customs, LLC, Benton, KY; Svizz-One Corporation Ltd., Thailand; South China Tire and Rubber Co., Ltd., China; American Omni Trading co., LLC, Houston, TX; Tire & Wheel Master, Inc., Stockton, CA; Simple Tire, Cookeville, TN; WTD Inc., Cerritos, CA; Guangzhou South China Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd., China; Turbo Wholesale Tires, Inc., Irwindale, CA;, Downey, CA; Lexani Tire Worldwide, Inc., Irwindale, CA; Vittore Wheel & Tire, Asheboro, NC; and RTM Wheel & Tire, Asheboro, NC.


On August 21, 2013, A&J Manufacturing filed a 337 patent case against imports of Outdoor Grills from China and other Countries.  A&J also filed numerous patent cases in Federal District Court at the same time targeting the Chinese and other foreign respondent companies.  The ITC notice is listed below along with the names of the target companies.

Docket No: 2974

Document Type: 337 Complaint

Filed By: V. James Adduci, II

Firm/Org: Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg

Behalf Of: A&J Manufacturing LLC and A&J Manufacturing Inc.

Date Received: August 21, 2013

Commodity: Multiple Mode Outdoor Grills and Parts


Letter to Lisa R. Barton, Acting Secretary, USITC; requesting that the Commission conduct an investigation under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended regarding Certain Multiple Mode Outdoor Grills and Parts Thereof. The respondents are: The Brinkmann Corporation, Dallas, TX; W.C. Bradley Co., Columbus, GA; GHP Group, Inc., Morton Grove, IL; Kamado Joe Company, Duluth, GA; Outdoor Leisure Products Inc., Neosho, MO; Rankam Group, Gardena, CA; Academy Ltd, Katy, TX; HEB Grocery Company d/b/a H-E-B, San Antonio, TX; Kmart Corporation, Hoffman Estates, IL; Sears Brands Management Corporation, Hoffman Estates, IL; Sears Holding Corporation, Hoffman Estates, IL; Sears, Roebuck, & Company, Hoffman Estates, IL; Tractor Supply Company, Brentwood, TN; Guangdong Canbo Electrical Co., Ltd, China; Chant Kitchen Equipment (HK) Ltd, China; Dongguan Kingsun Enterprises Co., Ltd, China; Zhejiang Fudeer, China; Ningbo Huige, China; Keesung Manufacturing Co., Ltd, China; Ningbo Spring Communication, China; and Wuxi Joyray International Corp., China.

Complaints are available upon request.


On August 13, 2013, Hopewell Culture & Design LLC filed the attached patent case against Huawei and ZTE.  HOPEWELLHUAWEIZTE

On August 15, 2013, Wyncomm filed the attached patent case against Huawei. WYNCOMM HUAWEI

On August 23, 2013, Straight Path IP Group, Inc. filed the attached patent cases against Huawei and ZTE. STRAIGHT PATH HUAWEI STRAIGHT PATH ZTE



Two class action antitrust complaints were filed in on August 21st and August 30th against Taiwan auto parts producers for price fixing.  AUTO PARTS TAIWAN ANTITRUST COMPLAINT AUTO PARTS TAIWAN ANTITRUST COMPLAINT FIREMAN’S AUTO PARTS TAIWAN



Attached is a class actions Securities case that was filed in the New York Federal District Court on August 27th against Lightinthebox Holding Co. located in Beijing, China.  LIGHTINTHE BOX HOLDING

Attached is a class actions Securities case filed against PetroChina in New York Federal District Court on September 3, 2013.  PETRO CHINA CLASS ACTION SECURITIES CASE


Attached is a memorandum of law filed on August 19th in New York Federal court in which China North East Petroleum Holdings Ltd. has agreed to pay $2.5 million to settle a proposed securities class action accusing it of improper accounting and embezzlement. CHINA PETROLEUM MOTION FOR PAYOFF The settlement ends the consolidated class action brought in 2010 claiming the company’s improper accounting tactics led to an overstatement of its net profit in 2008 and 2009.

CNEP was delisted from the New York Stock Exchange in May 2010, after various accounting issues forced it to restate financial results from 2008 and 2009, and its stock price dropped when it was relisted in September 2010.


Three Dorsey lawyers have recently written an article on the how Government Securities Enforcement Agencies in Hong Kong and the US have coordinated their enforcement actions to go after a company that specializes in investments in China, Japan and Korea.

Thomas Gorman is a partner in Dorsey & Whitney’s Washington, D.C. office and used to work in the enforcement division of the US Securities and Exchange Commission. David Richardson and Eden McMahon are partners in the firm’s Hong Kong office.

The Article is important because it demonstrates how Chinese companies listed in the US and HK can face enforcement actions for the same violations in two different countries.

The Article is set forth below:

How To Catch A Tiger —On Both Sides Of The Pacific

Government securities enforcement agencies in Hong Kong and the United States have been pursuing Tiger Asia Management and its affiliates for four years with claims of insider trading and market manipulation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In Hong Kong, that pursuit has resulted in an important legal precedent regarding the arsenal of weapons available to the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission. In the United States, it has demonstrated the ability of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission working in tandem with the U.S. Department of Justice to exact significant enforcement remedies relating to overseas transactions even after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Bank of Australia (2010).

Tiger Asia: A New York Hedge Fund Trading in Hong Kong

Tiger Asia is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in New York City specializing in equity investments in China, Japan and Korea. It has no physical presence or employees in Hong Kong, but maintained accounts in Hong Kong to enable it to trade in Hong Kong securities. All of Tiger Asia’s employees are in New York.

As a hedge fund, Tiger Asia is able to take short positions in equities. Between 2008 and 2009, Tiger Asia participated in three private placements for the securities of two Chinese banks. In each instance the placing agents approached Raymond Park, the head trader for the funds, about participating in a private placement of bank shares. Park agreed in his New York office. Prior to being given details of the placement, he agreed to Tiger Asia being “wall crossed,” a term used in the financial services industry to mean it agreed to receive price-sensitive information that was not generally known to the public, as part of selective pre-marketing of an offering to potential investors.

After entering into the wall-crossing agreements, under which Tiger Asia agreed not to trade shares of the banks, Bill Hwang ordered Park to short sell the relevant stock on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in the days prior to each placement. Park did not inform the placement agent in either instance that their agreement had been breached.

As a result of the trading, Tiger Asia had net trading profits of about HK$16.2 million (US$2.09 million).

Hong Kong Securities Enforcement Legal Framework

Hong Kong has a dual civil/criminal regime to deal with misconduct in the financial markets under the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO). There is the Market Misconduct Tribunal (MMT), on the one hand, which imposes civil liability for market misconduct and can make orders barring a person from being a director or manager of a corporation, or from dealing in securities and can order disgorgement of any profits made or losses avoided to the Hong Kong government.

On the other hand, the SFO creates criminal offenses for various types of market misconduct. The two regimes are mutually exclusive, and proceedings brought by the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong (HK SFC) under one means there can be no further proceedings under the other.

The question under consideration in the Hong Kong courts to date was essentially whether or not section 213 of the SFO, under which the courts have wide-ranging power to make a number of injunctions and orders on the application of the HK SFC, provides a “third route” for final orders, or if a prosecution under Part XIV or proceedings before the MMT under Part XIII was a prerequisite.

Proceedings in the Hong Kong Courts

The HK SFC applied for various orders against Tiger Asia. The HK SFC based its action on section 213(1), which states that where a person has contravened any of the relevant provisions (including the prohibition on insider dealing), the Court of First Instance (CFI) may make orders on the application of the HK SFC.

In HK SFC v. Tiger Asia, Hwang, Park and Tomita, the CFI[1], held that the court did not have the jurisdiction to make the declarations sought by the HK SFC because the criminal court or the MMT had not yet determined whether there had been a contravention of the relevant market misconduct provisions; the CFI had no jurisdiction to itself decide whether or not there had been a contravention.

The HK SFC appealed. The Court of Appeal[2] allowed the appeal and ruled that section 213 procedures are freestanding from the dual civil/criminal market misconduct process.

On April 30, 2013, the Court of Final Appeal[3] (CFA), in a unanimous decision, confirmed the decision in the Court of Appeal and held that the CFI does have independent jurisdiction to make orders under section 213 without any prior finding by a criminal court or the MMT in respect of any contravention of the relevant provisions of the SFO. Part of the reasoning of the court is that section 213 is concerned with providing remedies for the benefit of parties involved in the impugned transactions, and serves a different purpose from the penalties that can be imposed by a criminal court or the MMT. As we will see below, the HK SFC is keen to act as both a prosecutor in the general public interest and protector of the collective interests of the persons dealing in the market who have been injured by market misconduct.

Civil and Criminal Enforcement in the United States

SEC v. Tiger Asia Management LLC (D. N.J. Filed Dec. 12, 2012) is an action of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission against the firm.

The complaint of the SEC centers on two sets of transactions. First, the short and long sales of shares in the two banks as noted above. Second, the complaint focuses on an attempted manipulation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

In four instances, Tiger Asia attempted to manipulate the month-end closing prices of certain stocks listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The stocks were among its largest short holdings. In each instance, Tiger Asia placed trades that were intended to depress the price of the stock, thereby increasing the value of its short position. Since the management of Tiger Asia was paid a fixed annual management fee equal to 1.5 percent of the value of the net assets of the fund, calculated at the end of the month, this action increased the fees by US$496,000. The SEC’s complaint alleges violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934[4], section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933[5], and sections 206(1), 206(2) and 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act.[6]

The defendants settled the action, consenting to the entry of permanent injunctions prohibiting future violations of the sections cited in the complaint. In addition, defendants Hwang and Tiger Asia will collectively pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of US$19,048,787. Each also agreed to pay a penalty of  US$8,294,348. Park agreed to pay US$39,819 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and a penalty of US$34,897.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey announced a parallel criminal action against Tiger Asia. The disgorgement and prejudgment interest paid by defendants Hwang and Tiger Asia will be paid to the criminal authorities.


The availability of section 213 relief is of particular importance to the HK SFC in the context of combating market misconduct perpetrated by offshore market participants. A reason why the HK SFC opted for section 213 in pursuing its action against Tiger Asia was to avoid what it perceives as the slow and cumbersome procedure under the MMT regime, which can result in many years passing before a determination of a contravention is reached. In the absence of a relevant bilateral extradition agreement, it will often be difficult (if not impossible) for prosecutions to be made against the offshore wrongdoer.[7]

Moreover, section 213 is not limited to insider trading or market misconduct offenses, but also applies to alleged contraventions of any SFO provisions as well as certain provisions of the Companies Ordinance and the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (Financing Institutions) Ordinance.[8]

The response of the HK SFC should also be taken as a solemn reminder for offshore wrongdoers who wish to take advantage of the difficulty of cross-country law enforcement: The HK SFC has instituted MMT civil proceedings (as criminal proceedings have been instituted in the United States) recently against Tiger Asia. This is the first time the HK SFC has instituted proceedings in the MMT directly. Meanwhile, proceedings under section 213 are expected to continue.

Across the Pacific, the SEC action against Tiger Asia illustrates the reach of the agency. Despite the clear ruling by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.[9] that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act does not reach transactions where the purchase or sale did not occur in the United States, the action brought here by the SEC relied in part on that provision.

Other courts have held that the Morrison limitation also applies to section 17(a) of the Securities Act, a second statute relied on by the SEC to bring this action. In contrast, at least one court has held that Morrison does not apply to sections 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act. Whether the SEC would have been able to sustain this action in view of Morrison if the defendants had not elected to settle is at best problematic. Since the U.S. wire fraud statute on which the criminal case is based is not limited by Morrison, the U.S. Attorney did not face the same limitation in filing its charges.

–By Thomas O. Gorman, David A. Richardson and Eden McMahon, Dorsey & Whitney


[1] HCMP 1502/2009

[2] CACV 178/2011

[3] FACV Nos 10, 11, 12 and 13 of 2012

[4] This is the principal statutory weapon against fraud.

[5] This is a key anti-fraud provision in the Securities Act. It provides for liability for fraudulent sales of securities. Section 17(a) makes it unlawful to “employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,” “obtain money or property” by using material misstatements or omissions,” or to “engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” This provision is closely tracked by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.

[6] The sections laid down the prohibited transactions by registered investment advisers.

[7] The primary legislation governing the surrender of fugitive offenders between Hong Kong and the United States is the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (Cap. 503) and the Fugitive Offenders (United States of America) Order (Cap. 503F), which contains the full text of the Agreement between Hong Kong and the United States for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders signed in 1996. Another related legislation is the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance (Cap. 525) and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (United States of America) Order (Cap. 525F), which implements the Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of the United States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters signed in 1997.

[8] Please see section 213 and Schedule 1 of the SFO.

If you have any questions about these cases or about the US trade, customs, patent, antitrust or securities law in general, please feel free to contact me.

Best regards,

Bill Perry


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